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NOTES
TRULY PROTECTING THE CONSUMER IN LIGHT
OF THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS:
HOW GENERALLY APPLICABLE STATE
CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS MUST BE A




"There needs to be more focus on consumers."I President of the
American Bankers Association, Edward L. Yingling, will at least concede
that sentiment in the wake of homeowners losing an estimated $3.3 trillion
in equity in 2008, predictions that 8.1 million homes in the United States
will likely be foreclosed upon in the next four years and various other
I Joe Nocera, Have Banks No Shame?, N.Y. TIMES, October 9, 2009, at Bl.
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disturbing results of the recent subprime mortgage crisis. 2 Beyond simply
acknowledging that there must be more focus on consumers in the lending
industry, lenders and their lobbyists have shown, and continue to exhibit, a
proclivity to fight the imposition of any proposed consumer protection-
oriented regulations. 3 In fact, recently those in the banking industry, and
their lobbyists, have demonized the Obama administration's soon to be
enacted Consumer Financial Protection Agency by classifying it as "a
bunch of power-hungry bureaucrats who want to impose onerous new
regulations." 4
Politics aside, it is important to acknowledge the enormity of the crisis
produced by the current system. Though estimates of the total number of
families who will lose homes as a result of subprime mortgages vary
widely, 5 a recent study by the Center for Responsible Lending projects that
1 in 4 subprime loans are either delinquent or in foreclosure, and an
estimated total of 2.4 million foreclosures occurred in 2009 alone.6 The
study further predicts that over the next four years foreclosures will affect
91.5 million "nearby homes," reducing property values totaling $1.86
trillion, or $20,300 per household.7 Beyond the study, politicians and
scholars assert that there needs to be reinvestment in rebuilding foreclosed
and abandoned homes in neighborhoods throughout the country, as many
have experienced devaluation in properties and increases in crime. 8 The
2 Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN.
L. REV. 1257, 1260 (2009); see generally R. Christopher Whalen, The Subprime Crisis- Cause, Effect
and Consequences, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 219, 227-31 (2008) (listing
and explaining various effects of the subprime crisis).
3 See Nocera, supra note 1 (noting that critics assert that the banks have continued to oppose
consumer protection even under Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, who has been more generous to them
than his predecessors); Carl Hulse, Citi Reaches Deal With Lawmakers on Home Loans, N.Y. TIMES,
January 8, 2008, at B I (asserting that financial industry lobbyists vowed to fight legislation that would
let bankruptcy judges adjust mortgages for at-risk borrowers).
4 Joe Nocera, The Consumer Financial Protection Agency Gets a Big Push.
http://executivesuite.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/09/the-consumer-financial-protection-agency-gets-a-
big-push/; see also Ann Graham, Financial Regulatory Reform: Genesis Progress, and Impact, 55
VILL. L. REV. 603, 610-11 (2010).
5 Alan M. White, The Case For Banning Subprime Mortgages, 77 U. CIN. L. REv. 617, 631 (2008)
(noting the disparity among reported home losses resulting form the subprime crisis); see also
Christopher A. Richardson, An Economic View of the Housing Crisis, 41 CONN L. REV. 1133, 1136-37
(2009) (noting that delinquency rates in subprime mortgages were almost five times that of prime
mortgages).
6 Center For Responsible Lending, Soaring Spillover: Accelerating Foreclosures to Cost Neighbors
$502 Billion in 2009 Alone; 69.5 Million Homes Lose $7,200 on Average at 1, (May 2009) available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/soaring-spillover-3-09.pdf
7 Id. at 2.
8 See Press Release, N.J. Governor David A. Paterson, Governor Paterson Announces $59 Million
to Assist Communities Affected By Foreclosure and Subprime Crises (Apr. 14, 2009), available at
http://www.state.ny.us/governor/press/press_0414094.html (summarizing thoughts from politicians
across the country about remedying damages resulting from the subprime mortgage crisis); Posting of
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general conclusion from this study is that the epidemic of home loss is
severe and it is imperative that policymakers take action to assist struggling
homeowners, as well as enact common-sense regulations to ensure this
disaster does not happen again. 9
Some advocate for a total ban on the practice of subprime mortgage
lending because it "created a market in which predatory lending could
flourish".l0 However, following through on such a ban is difficult in
practice because there is no exact definition of a subprime mortgage." To
understand what a subprime mortgage is, it is useful to focus on "two
defining features: (1) the borrower, because of income and credit history, is
more likely to default on the mortgage; and (2) the terms of the mortgage
are less favorable than a typical, 'prime' mortgage."' 2 The mechanics of
subprime lending, along with the related practice of securitization, will
later be explored in detail. Predatory lending also does not have a precise
or uniform definition.13 It is a phrase used to describe various lending
practices, but an all-encompassing definition is difficult to discover
because classification of lending behavior as predatory or fair depends
invariably upon context and the standards of the beholder.14 Any definition,
therefore, must be flexible, accommodate context, and focus on the intent
Katherine Santiago to NJ.com, N.J. report shows crime rose 5 percent in early 2008, (May 4, 2009,
19:27 EST) available at, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/05/nj crime-rate rose 5_percenti
/1607/comments-newest.html (stating that a Rutgers University professor attributed increases in crime
to abandoned homes in the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis).
9 See Center For Responsible Lending, supra note 6, at 3.
10 White, supra note 5, at 633-34; see also Barbara Crutchfield George et al., The Opaque And
Under-Regulated Hedge Fund Industry: Victim Or Culprit In The Subprime Mortgage Crisis?, 5
N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 359, 380 (2009) (noting that Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan
never exercised his authority to "ban financially irresponsible mortgages, such as subprime loans").
11 See Michael Aleo & Pablo Svirsky, Foreclosure Fallout: The Banking Industry's Attack on
Disparate Impact Race Discrimination Claims Under the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 3; see also C. Lincoln Combs, Banking Law and Regulation:
Predatory Lending in Arizona, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 617, 619 n.11, 621 (2006).
12 Aleo & Svirsky, supra note I1; Jonathan Macey, et al., Helping Law Catch Up to Markets:
Applying Broker-Dealer Law to Subprime Mortgages, 34 IOWA J. CORP. L. 789, 799 (2009) (attempting
to supply a functional definition of a subprime mortgage).
13 Baher Azmy, Squaring The Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States as Laboratories of
Experimentation, 57 FLA. L. REv. 295, 297 (2005) (.'[P]redatory lending' in the home-mortgage market
eludes a precise or uniform definition."); see Hasa A. Kingo, Preying On tThe American Dream: The
Argument For HOEPA Reform Amidst Predatory Lending's Dire Effects On The Elderly Poor, 17 GEO.
J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y 335, 367 (2010) (stating that there is no consensus about a definition of
predatory lending).
14 Azmy, supra note 13, at 299-300 ("[d]efinitions are particularly elusive because the
classification of lending behavior as predatory or fair depends invariably upon context."); James H. Carr
& Lopa Kolluri, Fannie Mae Foundation, Predatory Lending: An Overview (2001),
http://www.knowledgeplex.org/kp/textdocumentsummary/article/relfiles/hottpics/Carr-Kolluri.pdf
("depending on the unique characteristics of an individual loan and specific borrower, loan provisions
that may be predatory in one instance, such as a prepayment penalty, may be reasonable and legitimate
under others.")
2011] 769
770 JOURNAL OFCIVL RIGHTS & ECONOMCDEVELOPAENT [Vol.25:4
of the lender as well as the impact on the victim. 15 Therefore, whether a
particular subprime mortgage should be classified as predatory can be
debated. However, it cannot be contested that the interplay between the
issuance of subprime mortgages and predatory lending practices deserves
great attention in the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis.
This note will argue that the most effective way to protect the consumer,
and the country as a whole, from another disaster like the subprime
mortgage crisis of the 2000s is through the enforcement of state statutes
that prohibit unfair or deceptive acts and practices ("state UDAP
statutes"),16 or a similar state consumer protection law that is generally
applicable to all types of businesses, in conjunction with the more pointed
federal and state laws regulating lending that are currently codified. In
practice, this means that judges who are confronted with a claim that a
particular lender has engaged in an "unfair or deceptive act or practice,"
despite not engaging in conduct affirmatively illegal under the more
pointed federal and state statutes, must take into account the public policy
behind such law and employ balancing tests to determine if the consumer
was unfairly taken advantage of based on the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. 17
Given the current conditions,18 it should be evident that sufficient and
lasting protection against consumers executing unfavorable loans must go
beyond the previous methodology employed by the government.
Government at the federal and state levels has either had difficulties in
enforcing laws passed to address predatory lending, or simply neglected to
enforce the existing laws.' 9 In response to this failure, it will be shown that
employment of state UDAP statutes to predatory lending would more often
afford borrowers the right to have the legal system determine whether they
were taken advantage of, regardless of whether or not the alleged culprit
found a way get around the more pointed, lending specific statues.20 Such
flexible judicial power, in having the ability to rule for a wronged
consumer, is a necessary check on an industry that often has acted without
15 Azmy, supra note 13, at 300 ("Any definition, therefore, must be flexible and accommodate
context and not only should identify core objective criteria but also should focus on the intent of the
lender as well as the impact on the victim."); Carr & Kolluri, supra note 14 ("For this reason, regulatory
agencies and other institutions are cautious about instituting broad-based and sweeping regulations that
could undermine legitimate sources of financing for credit-impaired households.")
16 See e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2 (2010); NY GEN Bus LAW §349 (2010).
17 See infra Part IV A.
18 See supra pp. 1-2; infra Part I C.
19 See infra Parts II & III; Kingo, supra note 13 (stating that confusion leads to nominal
enforcement and the mere existence of laws negates the need for their aggressive enforcement).
20 See discussion infra Part IV.
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regard to whether their loan "product" is actually prudent for a borrower to
"buy." 21
Part I of this note explains the explosion and prevalence of subprime
mortgage lending, the mechanics and dangers of the securitization process
underlying subprime lending and predatory lending practices. Part II
explores federal and state legislation enacted to protect consumers. Part III
outlines the development of federal agencies that are charged with
protecting consumers from predatory lending and discusses the damaging
effects of those agencies' use of preemption. Part IV concludes by
advocating for judges to entertain private lawsuits against lenders under
state UDAP statutes. Part IV also argues that if judges employ balancing
tests similar to that used in Commonwealth v. Fremont Investment &
Loan22 in such lawsuits, it could go a long way in ensuring there will never
be a similar crisis in the future.
I. SUBPRIME MORTGAGE LENDING, PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES AND
How THE RECENT UNCHECKED PREVALENCE OF BOTH HAS RESULTED IN
AN ECONOMIC CRISIS
This part explores controversial lending practices and how their
pervasiveness led to recent crisis conditions. Section A discusses the three
quality categories comprising the mortgage market, and explains why
subprime mortgages are by far the . It then explores the framework of
securitization and how its application to subprime mortgage lending
practices first led to a boom in the American mortgage market, and then,
just as quickly, helped contribute to today's crisis conditions. Section B
then turns to predatory lending, which typically involves the use of
deceptive tactics by lenders, some affirmatively illegal and others on the
fringe of legality, to entice borrowers to give them business. It further
expounds upon the notion that differentiating between an acceptable
subprime loan and a predatory one is not an easy task, but the context of
the loan at issue is certainly a key consideration. Section C ends by
describing some of the devastating effects of the subprime mortgage crisis,
to illustrating that there must never be another such crisis.
21 See discussion infra Part I; see e.g., Jenifer B. McKim, Attorney Sues Lenders, Says They
Created 'Toxic' Products, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 5, 2009 (describing an action brought against
subprime lenders).
22 No. 07-4373-BLS1, 2008 WL 1913940 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 2008).
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A. Subprime Mortgage Lending
a. The Mechanics of Subprime Mortgages and Securitization
Modem home mortgages generally fall into three broad credit quality
categories, with subprime mortgages being the riskiest.23 The most
prevalent type of residential mortgage is the conforming mortgage. 24
Conforming mortgages are so named because they meet the standards
required for purchase by government sponsored entities such as the Federal
National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae") and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac").25 In order to have this
designation, the mortgage at issue must have an initial principal amount of
less than $417,000 and meet six additional criteria. 26 The second type of
mortgage is known as an "Alt-A" mortgage. 27 "Alt-A" mortgages fail to
meet the standards of conforming loans because they fail to meet one of the
requisite standards. 28 Since "Alt-A" loans are slightly riskier, borrowers
will usually pay a higher interest rate and more fees than a conforming
23 See David Schmudde, Responding To The Subprime Mess: The New Regulatory Landscape, 14
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 709, 715-16 (2009) (providing an overview of the mortgage landscape
before the housing crisis); Sumit Agarwal, et al., Comparing the Prime and Subprime Mortgage
Markets 241 CHI. FED LETTER 1, 1 (2007), available at http://qa.chicagofed.org/digital-assets/
publications/chicagofed letter/2007/ cflaugust2007_241.pdf (differentiating between prime, subprime,
and "Alt-A" mortgages).
24 See Schmudde, supra note 23, at 715 (describing three different types of mortgages); Agarwal,
et al., supra note 23, at 2 ("According to the Mortgage Bankers Association, prime mortgages make up
about 80% of the mortgage market, subprime mortgages about 15%, and Alt-A loans about 5%.").
25 See 12 U.S.C. § 1717(b)(1) (2008) amended by Pub. L. No. 110-289 (defining the requirements
that must be fulfilled before a mortgages can be purchased or sold); Schmudde, supra note 23, at 716
(explaining conforming mortgages).
26 See 12 U.S.C. § 1717(b)(2) amended by Pub. L. No. 110-289 stating that conforming mortgages
"shall not exceed $417,000 for a mortgage secured by a single-family residence, $533,850 for a
mortgage secured by a 2-family residence, $645,300 for a mortgage secured by a 3-family residence,
and $801,950 for a mortgage secured by a 4-family residence"; Schmudde, supra note 23, at 717. These
criteria are:
(1) The borrower's income must be verified (usually with wage statements and income tax
returns); (2) The borrower must have good credit (a credit score of 720 or higher); (3) The
proposed mortgage principal must be less than 80% of the appraised value of the home (a loan-to-
value ratio of 80% or less);(4) The proposed monthly mortgage payment plus the monthly real
estate tax bill must not exceed 28% of the borrower's gross monthly income; (5) The borrower
may not have other excessive outstanding loans or debt; and (6) Total debt payments, including
this mortgage, do not exceed 35% of the borrower's gross monthly income. Id
27 See Schmudde, supra note 23, at 718 (providing an overview of "Alt-A" mortgages); Agarwal,
et al., supra note 23, at 2 ("[Blorrowers who have relatively good current credit scores, but who fail to
provide sufficient documentation to verify income or who have high [debt-to-income] ratios, are
eligible for Alt-A loans").
28 One missing requirement could include a credit score below the conforming standards. See
Schmudde, supra note 23, at 718. A leading scholar has defined the "Alt-A" mortgage lending market
as covering "medium risk" loans between subprime and prime. Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and
Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1073, 1089 (2009).
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borrower. 29 Nonetheless, "Alt-A" loans are generally expected to perform
in the future. 30 The third classification for residential loans, and those with
the highest risk of default, are subprime mortgages. 31
Subprime mortgages are controversial because they are non-conforming
mortgages which fall far short of reaching the standards and practices
required for conforming loans. 32 Subprime borrowers are subjected to
significantly higher interest rates and fees than conforming or Alt-A
borrowers. 33 While many borrowers did not fully appreciate the
unfavorable terms they were signing up for, 34 even borrowers who
understood the conditions paid little heed to the obvious dangers of such a
loan because they were simply happy to be offered a mortgage.35 In recent
years, most subprime mortgages were made with no verification of the
borrower's income ("no doc" or "no document loans"), 36 and many were
obtained by borrowers with poor credit history and credit scores below
580.37 Subprime mortgages were often given for close to 100% value of the
29 See Schmudde, supra note 23, at 718 (explaining that "Alt-A" loans carry higher interest rates
because they are generally made on "less favorable terms than conforming loans"); Agarwal, et al.,
supra note 23, at 2 (describing the risk level associated with "Alt-A" loans).
30 See Schmudde, supra note 23, at 718-19. This may explain why the "Alt-A" market recently
experienced significant growth, much like subprime mortgage lending, "expanding from 2 percent of
total originations in 2003 to 13 percent of originations in 2006." Bar-Gill, supra note 28, at 1089.
31 See Schmudde, supra note 23, at 719 (defining subprime mortgages as "non-conforming
mortgages which do not meet the standards for conforming loans by a substantial margin"); Agarwal, et
al., supra note 23, at 1 (suggesting that that "[t]he main difference between prime and subprime
mortgages lies in the risk profile of the borrower," and that "subprime mortgages are offered to higher-
risk borrowers").
32 See Schmudde, supra note 23, at719 (arguing that U.S. residential mortgages were a substantial
cause of the recent financial meltdown); see also text accompanying notes 33-39 (describing the
onerous terms accepted by subprime borrowers, and the substantial discrepancy between subprime and
conforming mortgage requirements).
33 Schmudde, supra note 23, at 720 (discussing the general terms of most subprime mortgages);
see Bar-Gill, supra note 28, at 1075 (noting that the additional risk uniquely associated with subprime
loans manifested in higher interest rates for subprime borrowers).
34 Shelley Smith, Reforming the Law ofAdhesion Contracts: A Judicial Response to the Sub-Prime
Mortgage Crisis, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1035, 1043 (2010) (postulating that the millions of teaser-
rate subprime loans issued suggest that many borrowers were not cognizant of the "risks inherent in
their agreements"); McKim, supra note 21, at 5 ("1 feel as though I've been fooled or bamboozled into
this program that they locked me into knowing from the very start it would be unaffordable for me ...
Have you ever felt hopeless? That's how I'm feeling").
35 Schmudde, supra note 23, at 720 (finding that borrowers were willing to accept the onerous
terms of a subprime mortgage because they were happy to be offered a mortgage in the first place); see
Smith, supra note 34, at 1040 (identifying residential mortgages as adhesion contracts because
borrowers have "no choice but to accept the lenders' terms or forgo purchasing their home").
36 Eggert, supra note 2, at 1286 (asserting that many loans were made to borrowers with no
documented ability to repay, including no confirmation of income, employment, or any assets); see
Baldy Martinez, Subprime Loans: Turning the American Dream into a Nightmare, 21 ST. THOMAS L.
REv. 514, 519-20 (2009) (explaining that the frequent use of "no doc loans" attracted subprime
borrowers with little or no documentation of their ability to repay the loan).
37 Schmudde, supra note 23, at 719 (contrasting subprime mortgages with conforming mortgages
that require a credit score of 720 or higher); see Evan M. Gilreath, The Entrance of Banks into Subprime
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home and at a 10-11% annual percentage rate. 38 Also, mortgage brokers
took home an additional 0.2% to 0.4% in fees at origination. 39 In addition,
there were some subprime mortgages made to well-qualified speculators
who would leverage the purchase of many homes and condominiums "in
the hope that they could be quickly 'flipped' for an easy profit". 40
The subprime mortgage crisis was caused in large part by the financial
mechanism of securitization, which had previously caused the subprime
lending business to thrive in the late 1990s. 41 Securitization of subprime
loans began in the late 1980s, when subprime lenders in California realized
they could offload their subprime loans to Wall Street investors by selling
securities based on a pool of those subprime loans.42 For years, many
commentators had praised securitization and its benefits for the mortgage
industry.43 Securitization of subprime mortgages further grew and thrived
Lending: First Union and The Money Store, 3 N.C. BANKING INST. 149, 150-51 (1999) (describing
three broad categories of people who seek out subprime loans: people with poor credit, people with very
little credit history, and people who are over-indebted).
38 Schmudde, supra note 23, at 719 (distinguishing subprime mortgages from conforming
mortgages that require a loan-to-value ratio of 80% or less); see Martinez, supra note 36, at 532 (noting
that when a borrower financed 100% of the purchase price, as was commonly done, the borrower had
limited or no equity in the property).
39 Schmudde, supra note 23, at 720 (scrutinizing the practices of "greedy lenders" offering
subprime mortgages); see Christina Binkley, Mortgage Lenders Pursue Once-Shunned Borrowers,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 1996, at Fl(explaining that subprime loans are profitable to lenders not only
because of high interest rates but because of origination fees of 5-10% of the loan total).
40 Schmudde, supra note 23, at 720 (identifying additional ways the subprime market was taken
advantage of by opportunistic borrowers); see Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and
Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U. COLO L. REv. 1 (2009) (suggesting that some subprime
borrowers engaged in "Ponzi-like schemes" where they would "flip" the home, resell it for profit, and
retire the mortgage).
41 See Eggert, supra note 2, at 1262, 1267 (proposing that securitization was a significant cause of
the subprime boom in the late 1990s and eventual crash); cf Richard M. Hynes, Securitization, Agency
Costs, and The Subprime Crisis, 4 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 231, 275 (2009) (arguing that banking
deregulation was more to blame for the crisis than securitization, but noting that regulators may want to
ban securitization on other grounds).
42 Eggert, supra note 2, at 1266. The following is a "thumbnail sketch" of the how securitization is
accomplished according to a leading scholar:
In the process of mortgage securitization, a pool of mortgages is assembled ('pooled') and
transferred to an entity designed solely to hold those loans (the 'Special-Purpose Vehicle' or
SPV). Securities are then issued which are backed by those mortgages, and the securities are
sold to investors, who will be repaid from the payments made by borrowers or the proceeds of
foreclosure sales. A servicer collects the mortgage payments and may foreclose if necessary.
Typically, an investment house is involved in the pooling of subprime mortgages and resulting
sale of securities, and a rating agency rates the resulting securities. To provide different
investors with securities featuring different sets of risk and rewards, interest in the payment flow
from the mortgages is divided up into different strips of payments, called tranches, so that some
securities receive an earlier and more secure income stream in exchange for a lower return. The
securitization is set up so that the majority of the resulting securities would be rated AAA by the
rating agencies, indicating that they should be highly secure.
See also Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039,2045 (2007).
43 See Eggert, supra note 2, at 1265; see also Stephen L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset
774
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by allowing investors throughout the world to invest in real estate in the
United States through the purchase of securities backed by American
residential mortgages. 44 However, the securitization model was
fundamentally flawed because it allowed many subprime lenders to
profitably fail 45 - that is, companies would give out as many subprime
loans as possible during boom years, turn such loans into immediate profits
through securitization, and then go out of business, leaving billions of
dollars of bad loans in their wake. 46 Also, many actors involved in
securitization, including subprime loan originators and investors, were paid
based on the quantity rather than the quality of loans that they dealt with,
which led encouraged them to handle increasingly lower quality loans.47
Loan originators and their Wall Street enablers would securitize the
resulting risky loans, and sell mortgage-backed securities to investors.48
Also, subprime borrowers were convinced to pay 3% to 5% more in
interest, over the going rate for prime mortgages even though aggregate
losses to investors in mortgage backed securities did not call for such a
high rate prior to the entire system collapsing. 49
b. An Explosion in the Pervasiveness of Subprime Mortgages
The enormous short term profitability afforded to subprime mortgage
Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 133, 133 (1994) (illustrating how "securitization enables many
companies to raise funds at a lower cost than through traditional financing).
44 See Eggert, supra note 2, at 1265. "At least partially as a result of the funds pouring into the
American mortgage market, prices for American homes boomed, with average home prices increasing
from about $150,000 in 1997 to more than $250,000 in 2005."; see also L. Randall Wray, Lessons from
the Subprime Meltdown, LEVY ECON. INST. OF BARD COLL. Working Paper No. 522 (2007) available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1 070833.
45 Eggert supra note 2, at 1263 (explaining that securitization allowed operators of subprime
lending institutions to profit no matter what ultimately happened to the loans that their institutions had
originated); see also Michael G. Jacobides, Mortgage Banking Unbundling: Structure, Automation and
Profit, MORTGAGE BANKING, Jan. 1, 2001, at 28 (claiming that the mortgage banking industry is "one
of the most fascinating examples of vertical disintegration and reconfiguration" in business history).
46 Eggert, supra note 2, at 1263 (noting that lenders engaging in this model established the culture
and business methods of the subprime market); see also Bernhard Grossfeld &Hansjoerg Heppe,
Perspective: The 2008 Bankruptcy of Literacy - A Legal Analysis of the Subprime Mortgage Fiasco, 15
LAW & Bus. REV. AM. 713, 727 (explaining the culture of the subprime market and subsequent
popularity of betting on the materialization of certain default risks).
47 Eggert, supra note 2, at 1263. Further, credit ratings agencies did not help matters as often their
interests aligned with the lenders, or in some cases they failed to adequately rate the mortgage backed
securities because they were overwhelmed by their complexity. See id. at 1268; see also discussion
infra pp. 16-17.
48 See Eggert, supra note 2, at 1263; see also Joe Nocera, Lessons from the Financial Crisis, 52
ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010) (summarizing how mortgage-backed securities became corrupted, as
originators sold loans to Wall Street that borrowers were unable to pay back).
49 White, supra note 5, at 619; see also EDWARD G. GRAMLICH, SUBPRIME MORTGAGES:
AMERICA'S LATEST BOOM AND BUST 17 (2007) (explaining that, while subprime mortgages may sound
like a bad deal, it is still the cheapest source of credit for millions of potential borrowers).
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lenders through securitization and greater accessibility for low-income
families who were previously unable to buy homes led to a large spike in
the popularity of subprime lending, along with a widely held belief that the
benefits outweighed any possible harms. 50 Consequently, subprime
mortgages grew from $35 billion in 1995 to an astounding $807 billion in
2005.51 Subprime mortgages made up nearly 20% of the mortgage market
in 2005, compared to less than 5% in 2001.52 On Wall Street, the issuance
of collateralized debt obligation securities ("CDO securities"), backed by
subprime mortgages through the securitization process, increased from
$300 billion to almost $2 trillion between 1997 and 2006.53 As the
subprime mortgage industry grew to unforeseeable heights, the effects on
subprime borrowers who could not afford the onerous terms of their loans
were effectively ignored because the very same process of securitization
that allowed for maximum profitability in the business world also created
structural barriers to effective loan modification for defaulting borrowers.54
Often contracts underlying securitization would prohibit modifications
outright, vastly limit allowable modifications, or require consent of rating
agencies, bond insurers, or other parties with a stake in the mortgage
backed security at issue.55 The resulting indebted consumers, now in worse
50 White, supra note 5, at 620; see Kenneth W. Dam, The Subprime Crisis And Financial
Regulation: International And Comparative Perspectives, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 581, 636 (2010) ("The US
focus on affordable housing is socially praiseworthy and politically popular, but it was also the breeding
ground for the subprime crisis").
51 Schmudde, supra note 23, at 719 (discussing the rise in subprime lending); Frank L. Raiter,
Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and
Government Reform, I10th Cong. 2 (2008) (statement of Frank L. Raiter, Managing Director and Head
of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities Ratings Group, Standard and Poor's), available at
http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Hearings/Committee on Oversight/RaiterTestimony.pdf.
52 Schmudde, supra note 23, at 720-21; Chris Mayer & Karen Pence, Subprime Mortgages: What,
Where, and to Whom? 25 fig. 1B (Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Divs. of Research
& Statistics & Monetary Affairs, NBER Working Paper No. 14083, June 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/PUBS/FEDS/2008/200829/200829pap.pdf (reporting subprime
lending's share of the mortgage market).
53 Eggert, supra note 2, at 1267 (discussing the process of securitization and Wall Street's roll in
the securitization of subprime backed loans); Yongheng Deng et al., CDO Market Implosion and the
Pricing Of Subprime Mortgage-Backed Securities, at 3 (Working Paper No. Mar., 2009), (discussing
the rise of CDO issuing) available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract-id=1356630).
54 See Kurt Eggert, Comment on Michael A. Stegman et al.'s "Preventive Servicing Is Good for
Business and Affordable Homeownership Policy": What Prevents Loan Modifications?, 18 HOUSING
POL'Y DEBATE 279, 279 (2007) (putting forth several factors that affect the likelihood of loan
modification); Navid Vazire, Flawed Institutions and Markets: From the Savings & Loan Debacle
Forward: Smoke and Mirrors: Predatory Lending and the Subprime Mortgage Loan Securitization
Pyramid Scheme, 30 PACE L. REV. 41, 43-44 (2009) (discussing the numerous fees collected by
originators, and their lack of concern for a borrower's ability to repay the debt).
55 See Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis, 13
N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 93 (2009) (explaining various barriers that securitization puts on the ability to
modify underlying mortgages); Raymond H. Brescia, Capital in Chaos: The Subprime Mortgage Crisis
and the Social Capital Response, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 271, 299 (2008) (concluding that market forces
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financial shape than before they became homeowners, undoubtedly felt just
like others who had been victims of predatory lending.56
B. Predatory Lending Practices
a. Various Tactics Employed In Predatory Lending
While predatory lending escapes a uniform definition, it generally
involves the use of fraudulent tactics to induce a borrower to enter into a
loan transaction.57 Predatory lending has been classified as a shadowy
practice of particular mortgage brokers and finance companies
manipulating vulnerable low-income, elderly, and minority homeowners
into accepting mortgage products that would quickly, and inevitably, result
in devastating home foreclosures. 58 While early cases of predatory lending
mostly involved smalltime lenders, "[a]s the lines between the fringe and
prime markets ... blurred, mainstream lenders . .. turned to terms and
practices which [were] gradually approaching a point which reasonable
independent observers might describe as predatory." 59 Though it is unclear
precisely when, and for how long, widespread predatory lending practices
have existed, it was approximately ten to twelve years ago when
community groups and consumer advocacy organizations began to compile
stories of predatory lending and recognize persistent, core patterns among
them.60
encouraged brokers and originators to promote mortgages with little regard for the viability of the
borrower, in addition to the difficulty for a borrower to avoid foreclosure once a securitization
agreement was put into effect, is what caused the subprime mortgage crisis).
56 See supra, text accompanying note 34 (noting that many borrowers did not fully appreciate the
unfavorable terms to which they were agreeing); Dustin Fisher, Selling the Payments: Predatory
Lending Goes Primetime, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 587, 593 (2008) (mentioning that besides vulnerable
borrowers, even prime borrowers' willingness to forgo fixed-rate loans has caused predatory lenders to
move into the prime credit market).
57 Schmudde, supra note 23, at 721 ("Predatory lending involved using fraudulent tactics to induce
a borrower to enter into a loan."); Fisher, supra note 56, at 593-94 ("Predatory lending has always been
easier to identify than to define. In the absence of outright fraud, the loans are those which are simply
inappropriate for that particular borrower, or stated differently something a reasonable borrower would
avoid.").
58 Azmy, supra note 13, at 297;See Richard W. Stephenson, Spending It: Focus on Home Equity
Loans - Predatory Lending; How Serial Refinancing Can Rob Equity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1998, § 3
at 10 (noting the particular vulnerability of the elderly due to their often having substantial equity in
their homes while living on fixed incomes and that once a borrower has signed up, a lender's primary
goal is to keep the customer refinancing since that provides an opportunity to charge more fees).
59 Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory Lending by Banking
Agents: Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More Than They Can Chew?, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 515, 522
(2007) (stating that there is an increasing trend amongst lenders towards what could be considered
predatory lending practices, as the distinction between prime and sub-prime lending becomes less
clear).
60 See Azmy, supra note 13, at 297-98 (noting that, around the end of the 1990s, community and
consumer-protection groups began aggregating and publishing information regarding predatory lending
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Predatory lending can be classified into two sets of activities. 61 The first
set consists of activities that are clearly illegal or unconscionable, such as
directly misrepresenting the terms of a loan or forging signatures on loan
documents. 62 While guarding against these activities is of great importance,
a full exploration of their impact is beyond the scope of this note because
enforcement of existing laws, along with victims exercising the rights
already afforded to them, could logically solve this issue. 63 It is the second
class of predatory activities ("gray area class"), which exist on the fringes
of the law, that often results in borrowers paying more than they should,
given the market and their credit ratings, and that is engaged in without
much regard to whether borrowers can repay, that requires the more
proactive response advocated for in this note. 64
Among the gray area class of activities, one of the more difficult to
prosecute tactics employed by predatory lenders arises when they
purposely do not disclose the terms of a loan, which often include
excessive fees and outrageous interest rates. 65 Lenders have the ability to
practices); DEBORAH GOLDSTEIN, JOINT CTR. FOR Hous. STUDIES,HARVARD UNIV., UNDERSTANDING
PREDATORY LENDING: MOVING TOWARDS A COMMON DEFINITION AND WORKABLE SOLUTIONS 7
(1999), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/goldstein w99-l l.pdf
(explaining that since the mid-1990s, awareness of predatory lending amongst governmental and
community groups has grown through increased media coverage).
61 See Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in
Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 513 (2002) (stating that the practice of predatory
lending can be divided into two different activities); Allison De Tal, Knowledge is Power: Consumer
Education and the Subprime Mortgage Market, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 633, 641 n.57 (2008) (observing that
predatory lending can be broken down into two types of activities).
62 See Eggert, supra note 61, at 513 (explaining the first subset of predatory lending "consists of
those activities that are either clearly illegal or unconscionable by their very nature . . . . [including]
such actions as misrepresenting the terms of the loans and forging the signatures of borrowers on loan
documents"); De Tal, supra note 61, at 641 n.57 (describing the first of the two practices that make up
predatory lending as conduct which on its own is unconscionable or even illegal, examples of which
include misrepresentation or forgery).
63 See e.g., Laurie A. Burlingame, A Pro-Consumer Approach to Predatory Lending: Enhanced
Protection Through Federal Legislation and New Approaches to Education, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q.
REP. 460, 485 (2006) (advocating that increasing the availability of information for consumers online
can subvert predatory lending practices); Schmudde, supra note 23, at 767 (outlining a proposed
consumer counseling scheme to solve predatory lending problems).
64 See Eggert, supra note 61, at 513-15 (describing the second subset of predatory lending
activities as those that are legal, but are misused by unscrupulous lenders in order to take advantage of
borrowers); De Tal, supra note 61, at 641 n.57 (explaining that within the two-part scheme of predatory
lending, the second part involves lenders taking actions which are technically legal, but are misused to
take advantage of borrowers).
65 See Schmudde, supra note 23, at 721-22 (stating that predatory lenders will frequently fail to
disclose all the terms of the loan agreement, but that prosecutors have difficulty enforcing anti-
predatory lending laws, often because resources are lacking); Deborah Goldstein, Protecting Consumers
from Predatory Lenders: Defining the Problem and Moving Toward Workable Solutions, 35 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 225, 235, 241-42 (2000) (identifying one form of predatory lending as failure to
disclose details of costs and interest rates and noting that regulators have difficulty prosecuting
predatory lenders, largely due to lack of resources).
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engage in this approach when they utilize adjustable-rate mortgages
("ARMs"),66 mortgages in which the interest rate payable changes over the
term of the loan, a practice once formally endorsed by former Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan. 67 A typical way to employ this tactic is
to provide loans that originate with very low "teaser" rates during the first
few months of the mortgage. At the end of this period, however, the rates
skyrocket, leaving homeowners unable to afford monthly payments and
placing them at risk of foreclosure. 68 Borrowers afflicted with such
"payment shock" claim that the interest rate mechanisms of the loans were
not adequately disclosed and that they were only persuaded to take out the
loan because of deceptive or high-pressure sales tactics. 69 These "loans"
could be viewed as simply a pretense to fraudulently acquire a person's
home, but when the particular tactics employed are not affirmatively
illegal, it is nearly impossible to prove such a purpose of the loan. 70 Other
predatory tactics that are not explicitly illegal include "packing," which is
the practice of inducing borrowers to use some of their loans' proceeds to
pay for unnecessary or undesired products, and excessive prepayment
penalties, which are added to the amount the borrower must pay to retire a
loan before it reaches full term, since prepayments reduce the amount of
interest lenders can receive. 71
66 See Grossfeld &Heppe, supra note 46, at 713, 722-725, which explains that the mechanics of
this scheme dictate that predictable interest payments for subprime borrowers will be short lived,
because once the "Initial Period" concludes (the period during which a low, teaser rate is applied) and
the first reset date is reached, a much higher floating rate is locked in, with a new rate being set at the
end of each reset period. According to Schmudde, supra note 23, at 722, ARMs are often blamed for
having caused the majority of damage, in the context of the subprime collapse, and the introductory
rates on these loans are set at an artificially low rate, which greatly increases once the introductory
period has elapsed. Although the borrowers were induced into entering into the loan transaction because
of the low, introductory rate, they soon find that they are unable to afford the monthly payments
because the floating rates are simply too high.
67 See Grossfeld & Heppe, supra note 46, at 722 (describing Alan Greenspan's endorsement of
adjustable-rate mortgages); Sue Kirchhoff & Barbara Hagenbaugh, Greenspan Says ARMs Might Be
Better Deal, USA TODAY, Feb. 24, 2004, at IB (explaining that in 2004, Alan Greenspan stated that
many borrowers were overpaying for protection against floating interest rates (i.e., had entered into
fixed rate mortgages) and would have saved money had they instead entered into adjustable rate
mortgages).
68 Andrew J. Ceresney et al., Regulatory Investigations and the Credit Crisis: The Search For
Villains, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 225,261 (2009).
69 Id.
70 See Azmy, supra note 13, at 361 (stating that predatory lending laws have proven difficult to
enforce); Schmudde, supra note 23, at 722 (adding that prosecuting attorneys do not have the resources
to find those who engage in predatory lending practices).
71 Tania Davenport, An American Nightmare: Predatory Lending in the Subprime Home Mortgage
Industry, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 531, 542-43 (2003); Eggert, supra note 61, at 517.
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b. Where Do Acceptable Subprime Loans End and Unacceptable
Predatory Subprime Loans Begin?
What transforms an acceptable subprime loan into a predatory one
depends heavily on context. 72 Nevertheless, certain features that exist only
in predatory loans can give guidance.73 First, a loan is likely predatory if
credit is provided when it is not needed, on terms not justified by a
borrower's credit risk, or if it is used to extract unreasonable "economic
rents" from the borrower.74 Second, where there is a subjective intent of a
broker or lender to mislead, deceive or exploit a financially unsophisticated
borrower, the loan could be predatory. 75 Lastly, where the terms of the
credit or practices of the lender put a borrower at unreasonable risk of
default or foreclosure, a predatory loan likely exists. 76
C. The Resulting Crisis Conditions
Though the current economic recession is not entirely attributable to the
subprime mortgage crisis, in acknowledging that the U.S. economy may
have suffered most from intensified financial strains and the continued fall
in the housing sector, the April 2009 Global Financial Stability Report put
out by the International Monetary Fund estimates write-downs on U.S.-
originated assets by all financial institutions over 2007-10 to total $2.7
trillion.77 From a strictly domestic perspective, the Center for Responsible
Lending asserts that less home equity resulting from foreclosures and their
spillover effect on neighboring houses has, in combination with lenders
scaling back lending and lower amounts of consumer spending, led to
today's economic recession. 78 The report further asserts job losses and
72 See Azmy, supra note 13, at 319-20; Jonathan L. Entin & Shadya Y. Yazback, City
Governments and Predatory Lending, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 757, 759 (2007).
73 See Azmy, supra note 13, at 320; ALLEN FISHBEIN & HAROLD BUNCE, SUBPRIME MARKET
GROWTH AND PREDATORY LENDING, 7 available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/brd/I3
Fishbein.pdf (discussing features of predatory lending).
74 See Azmy, supra note 13, at 320. The dictionary defines an "economic rent" to be "the return on
a productive resource, as land or labor, that is greater than the amount necessary to keep the resource
producing or on a product in excess of what would have been the return except for some unique factor."
DICTIONARY.COM UNABRIDGED. Random House, Inc., available at http://dictionary.reference.com/
browse/economicrent (last visited November 29, 2009).
75 A primary distinction between subprime and predatory lending lies in the lender's intent. Azmy,
supra note 13, at 320; Diana McMonagle, In Pursuit of Safety and Soundness: An Analysis of the
OCC's Anti-Predatory Lending Standard, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1533, 1539 (2004).
76 See Azmy, supra note 13, at 320; Entin et al., supra note 72, at 761.
77 International Monetary Fund, Executive Summary (Jan. 2009), at 1, available at http://www.imf
.org/extemal/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/pdf/exesum.pdf
78 It further asserts that the resulting shortfall in state revenues through 2011 is estimated to total
$350 billion or higher. See For Responsible Lending, supra note 6, at 2.
780
PROTECTING TIlE CONSUMER
potential downturns in the stock market could result in a continued
downward spiral as they reduce household wealth even further. 79 It should
be apparent at this point that another catastrophe similar to the subprime
mortgage crisis must be protected against.
II. FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATION ENACTED TO PROTECT THE
CONSUMER
This part explores legislation focused on regulation of mortgage lending.
Section A discusses the development of federal laws on this front and
examines how lenders still found ways to bypass these regulations. Section
B turns to state legislation, and focuses on how the state of North Carolina
was a pioneer in aggressively combating predatory. It further demonstrates
that while a number of states have followed North Carolina's example, and
there is some evidence that such aggressive state legislation has had
positive effects, actions by state legislatures on their own are not enough to
ensure the subversion of another crisis.
A. Evolution ofFederal Legislation Aimed at Regulating Lending
The first uniform federal guidelines applicable to mortgage lending were
put forth in the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"),80 passed by Congress in
1968.81 The impetus for such legislation was the great expanse in the
consumer credit market following World War 11.82 TILA's purpose as
defined by Congress is: "to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms
so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various
credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to
protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit
card practices." 83 When applicable, TILA requires a creditor to "disclose
the amount financed, the annual percentage rate, the finance charge, and
the total number of payments to be made, including a payment schedule." 84
Even though TWA imposes limits on mortgage interest rates and requires
full disclosure of all fees, its provisions do not deter high rates on subprime
79 Id.
80 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2010).
81 Id.; Matthew A. Edwards, Empirical and Behavior Critiques Of Mandatory Disclosure: Socio-
economics and the Quest For Truth In Lending, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 199, 209 (2005).
82 Edwards, supra note 81, at 207; Mourning v. Family Publ'ns Serv., 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
83 15 U.S.C.S 1601 (a) (2010).
84 Burlingame, supra note 63, at 466.
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mortgages. 85 Though TILA allows for monetary damages and a right of
rescission in certain circumstances, home purchase loans cannot be
rescinded even if disclosure was inadequate. 86
The Real Estate Settlement Practices Act ("RESPA")87, enacted in 1974,
like TILA could be classified as a disclosure regime,88 but unlike TWA,
RESPA more narrowly focuses on requirements for lenders in a residential
transaction. 89 RESPA requires residential mortgage lenders to provide
borrowers a special information booklet along with "a good faith estimate
of the amount or range of charges for specific settlement services the
borrower is likely to incur in connection with the settlement." 90 Further
disclosure requirements include an itemization of all actual settlement costs
and escrow payments scheduled for the first year of the mortgage. 91
RESPA also "prohibits certain charges and kickbacks to third parties." 92
Nonetheless, an unfortunate reality of both RESPA, and its predecessor
TILA, is that they had little effect on borrowers' decision-making because
many mortgages are difficult for a lay person to understand on his or her
85 Schmudde, supra note 23, at 751 (noting that the limits imposed by TILA are ineffective in
keeping subprime mortgage rates down); Shelly George, The Mortgage Reform AndAnti Predatory Act
Of 2007: Paving A Secure Path For Minorities In the Midst Of the Subprime Debacle 10 SCHOLAR
449, 463 (calling attention to the lack of preventative measures in TILA).
86 Schmudde, supra note 23, at 751; Burlingame, supra note 63, at 466. It should be noted that the
rescission provisions can be applicable to "the refinancing of mortgage loans, junior liens, and other
nonpurchase transactions." Id. See also James L. Thompson & Jill Hutchison, Rescinding a Mortgage
Transaction under TILA after Refinancing the Loan, 23 REAL EST. FIN. No. 2 (2006), available at:
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl s20Publications%5CRelatedDocumentsPDFsl252%5C1453%5CTILA
Article RealEstateFinance.pdf.
87 12 U.S.C. §§2601-17 (2010).
88 Azmy, supra note 13, at 350 (noting that like TILA, RESPA requires lenders to disclose certain
details of the cost of loan settlement in a uniform statement); Arnold S. Rosenberg, Better Than Cash?
Global Prolferation ofPayment Cards and Consumer Protection Policy, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
520, 563-64 (2006);Peter Hong & Marcos Reza, Hidden Costs to Homeowners: The Prevalent Non-
Disclosure of Yield Spread Premiums in Mortgage Loan Transactions, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV.
131, 140 (2005) (discussing the different disclosure requirements under RESPA).
89 Schmudde, supra note 23, at 752 (highlighting the disclosure requirements for lenders in
residential transactions including, but not limited to, a good faith estimate of the charges and known
settlement costs); Frederick L. Miller, Consumer Law: Bait and Switch In The Mortgage Market, 85 MI
BAR J. 21, 21 (2006);Jessica Fogel, State Consumer Protection Statutes: An Alternative Approach to
Solving the Problem of Predatory Mortgage Lending, 28 SEATTLE UNIV. L. R. 435, 446 (2005) (stating
that one of the reasons Congress enacted RESPA was to protect consumers "against abusive practices
that were developing in the residential real estate industry.")
90 12 USCA § 2604(c) (2010).
91 Schmudde, supra note 23, at 752 ("[D]isclosures include: ... (3) actual settlement costs; and (5)
[sic] escrow payments scheduled for the first year of the mortgage."); 12 U.S.C. § 2601 Appx. ("The
loan originator must indicate whether the loan includes an escrow account for property taxes and other
financial obligations . . . '[y]our initial monthly amount owed for principal interest, interest, and any
mortgage insurance. . . [and] charges for all other settlement services . . . and the total estimated
settlement charges . . . .").
92 Azmy, supra note 13, at 350.
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own. 93 In industries where consumers have the capability to compare
products relatively easily, like shopping for groceries or household
electronics, regulations primarily focused on disclosure can be adequate.94
"In the context of the subprime mortgage market, however, the theoretical
premises of disclosure seem quaint and insufficient." 95 This is because
estimates are often "inaccurate and[can] confuse even [an] experienced
buyer." 96 Further, the predatory sector of the subprime market makes it
extremely difficult for consumers to compare price terms. 97 These logical
inadequacies with a disclosure regime, along with evidence of growth of
subprime and predatory lending in the 1980s, alerted Congress that more
work needed to be done.98
By passing the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994
("HOEPA"),99 Congress attempted to add some substantive teeth to its
regulatory scheme by imposing limitations on contract terms and lender
practices that have been identified as aspects of predatory lending. 00 For
93 Schmudde, supra note 23, at 752 (stating that the documents that are given to borrowers are
complex and are difficult for a lay person to understand without further explanation); Arielle L.
Katzman, A Round Peg For A Square Hole: The Mismatch Between Subprime Borrowers and Federal
Mortgage Remedies, 32 CARDOZO L. REv. 497, 509 (2009).;Rayth T. Myers, Foreclosing on the
Subprime Loan Crisis: Why Current Regulations are Flawed and What is Needed to Stop Another
Crisis from Occurring, 87 OR. L. REv. 311, 324-25 (2008) (arguing that RESPA is inadequate because
it does not "result in more well-informed borrowers" since "[p]roviding extremely complicated
information, particularly to unsophisticated borrowers, does not ensure they will understand it.")
94 Azmy, supra note 13, at 351 ("normative preference for disclosure may be well-justified for
products such as groceries, personal electronics . . . because consumers can compare products within
those categories relatively quickly with few or no transaction costs"); Christopher L. Peterson, Truth,
Understanding, And High-Cost Consumer Credit: The Historical Context Of The Truth In Lending Act,
55 FLA. L. REv. 807, 882 (2003); Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Impact of Truth-in-Lending Disclosures on
Consumer Market Behavior: A Critique of the Critics of Truth-in-Lending Law, 9 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REv. 117, 120 (1984) ("[F]eed[ing] consumers with the 'truth' ... liberate[s] them from their ignorance
about the structure of the credit market.").
95 Azmy, supra note 13, at 351.
96 Schmudde, supra note 23, at 752; Pearl A. Chin, Payday Loans: The Case For Federal
Legislation, U. ILL. L. REv. 723, 730 (2004).
97 See Azmy, supra note 13, at 351 (explaining that comparison of price terms is difficult due to
lenders deliberately making the loans complex, little price competition in the market, and disclosures
often being made to the borrower on the day of the loan closing when the borrower is already
psychologically committed to the loan); Angela Rowland, Defending the American Dream: Legislative
Attempts to Combat Predatory Lending, 50 S. TEX. L. REv. 343, 360 (2008) (discussing the lack of
borrowing power between the lenders, since the borrower's power is exacerbated by the fact that about
half of the adults in the United States lack the proper education and are unable to gauge information to
adequately determine the price difference between two different items).
98 Eggert, supra note 61, at 584; Tania Davenport, An American Nightmare: Predatory Lending in
the Subprime Home Mortgage Industry, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 531, 538. Predatory Lending continued
to grow when finance companies made loans to borrowers at lower income levels with imperfect credit.
99 See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. It should be noted that the Federal Reserve did not act pursuant to
the authority granted by HOEPA until July 14, 2008, until it issued "final rules amending Regulation Z,
which implements [both] TWA and HOEPA." 73 FR 44522-0; Schmudde, supra note 23, at 756.
100 Eggert, supra note 61, at 585; Jean Constantine-Davis. Hoeping for Better Days: The Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA), 1114 PLI/CORP. 243, 252 (1999) (listing the
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example, HOEPA bars most prepayment penalties,' 0 some balloon
payments,102 and the deceptive practice of negative amortization. 103 In
addition, creditors cannot engage in a "pattern or practice of extending
credit to consumers [through giving HOEPA loans] without regard to the
consumers' repayment ability."1 04 HOEPA also adds further disclosure
requirements to the loans that it covers, including a mandatory three day
cooling off period before the consumer can commit to the loan. 105 Another
attempt at protecting the consumer through HOEPA existed in the outlining
of scenarios in which limited liability would attach to assignees of HOEPA
loans. 106
The main problem with HOEPA is that predatory lenders have had no
trouble getting around the triggers that make a subprime loan a HOEPA
loan.107 In fact, "the types of unscrupulous lending practices that HOEPA
was designed to prevent now often occur in loans slightly under the
HOEPA triggers."108 Further, even when loans meet the triggers requisite
for HOEPA to govern, it has been very difficult for individual borrowers to
show that the lenders have engaged in the "pattern or practice" prohibited
above.109 The current dire consequences of the subprime mortgage collapse
requirements for certain closed-end mortgages)
101 Truth in Lending: Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(6);Constantine-Davis, supra note 100, at 254.
Under HOEPA, prepayment penalties had to meet three qualifications: they are only permitted during
the first 5 years, they cannot be charged at all if the creditor is refinancing its own loan, or that of an
affiliate, and when the loan was consummated, the debtor could not have more than a 50 debt-to-
income ratio and the financial information must be verified. Id.
102 See Constantine-Davis, supra note 101, at 253; Reg. Z, § 226.32(d)(1) (showing Balloon
payments are prohibited on HOEPA loans with terms of 60 months or less).
103 See 15 USC § 1639(f). In prohibiting negative amortization, the statutory language explains
"[a] mortgage ... may not include terms under which the outstanding principal balance will increase at
any time over the course of the loan because the regular periodic payments do not cover the full amount
of interest due." Id.
104 15 U.S.C. § 1639(h) (2000) (describing certain prohibitions regarding extending credit to the
consumer).
105 Eggert, supra note 61, at 584; see Constantine-Davis, supra note 100 (discussing additional
disclosure requirements).
106 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1641(e). Scholars have argued that application of the "Holder in Due Course
Doctrine" to mortgage loans, which "cuts off most defenses that a maker of a note might have once it is
assigned to a holder who takes it without notice of those defenses" is unwarranted, and a further
extension of assignee liability is appropriate within the context of securitization. See Eggert, supra note
61, at 508.
107 See Azmy, supra note 13, at 351; Eggert, supra note 61, at 587 (describing some of the ways
lenders get around HOEPA's authority).
108 Eggert, supra note 61, at 587. Current HOEPA "trigger" rates are located in 12 CFR §
226.32(a). Though the triggers have been lowered since they were first promulgated, it has not stopped
lenders from avoiding HOEPA's authority by pricing credit just below the triggers. See Michael J.
Pyle, A "Flip" Look at Predatory Lending: Will the Fed's Revised Regulation Z End Abusive
Refinancing Practices?, 112 YALE L.J. 1919, 1923.
109 Eggert, supra note 61, at 588 (analyzing the difficult burden of proof borrowers have in
showing banks engaged in loaning money based on equity).
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further illuminates HOEPA's inadequacies.110
Congress has also passed legislation aimed at regulating mortgage
lending through prohibiting discrimination with the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act ("ECOA"),111 and by imposing checks on the practices of
Credit Reporting Agencies ("CRAs") with the Fair Credit Reporting Act
("FCRA")112 and the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006
("CRARA").113 Unfortunately, the type of protection that potential low-
income immigrant and minority borrowers have needed in recent times is
not protection against borrowers denying them a loan based on their status
under ECOA.114 The real discriminatory danger that has not been
adequately addressed is the practice of predatory lenders giving such
borrowers loans and trapping them in unfair terms. 115 The attempted
statutory regulation of CRAs sought to achieve an important goal because
they were complicit in the subprime mortgage crisis through rating
mortgage based securities highly to please their clients, the lenders issuing
them.11 6 "CRAs were issuing ratings which were not supported by the
underlying instruments ... [t]hey behaved not only as protectors of
investors, but as enablers of the banks who were issuing the securities."17
However, no provisions in FCRA or CRARA take any steps in aligning
CRAs' interests with investors who actually rely on their ratings.118 More
importantly, legislation aimed at CRAs does not attack the predatory
lending problem at its source- predatory mortgage lenders. Consequently,
it can only go so far in protecting the borrower.
110 See infra Part I.C.
111 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2010) (detailing the discrimination which is prohibited in lending practices).
112 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2010) (describing the purpose of the statute).
113 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2010) (enumerating the procedures necessary to register nationally rating
agencies).
114 Id
115 See Nicole Lutes Fuentes, Defrauding The American Dream: Predatory Lending In Latino
Communities And Reform Of California's Lending Law, 97 CAL. L. REv. 1279, 1279-80 (chronicling a
an incident that exemplifies how predatory lenders can take advantage of immigrants); Vikas Bajaj &
Miguel Helft, The Loan that Keeps on Taking, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2007, at Cl (discussing a case in
which a broker steered clients to take loans the clients could not reasonably afford to repay).
116 Schmudde, supra note 23, at 743; see, Frank Partnoy, Second-Order Benefits from Standards,
47 B.C. L. REv. 169, 190 (2007) (noting the conflicts of interest that arises among rating agencies and
underlying banks).
117 Schmudde, supra note 23, at 743.
118 Id at 754 (discussing CRARA's inability to properly control credit rating agencies);
Christopher M. Bruner, States, Markets, and Gatekeepers: Public-Private Regulatory Regimes in an
Era ofEconomic Globalization, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 125, 143 (2008) (analyzing the conflicts of interest
present with the current rating agencies).
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B. A Look at State Legislation
Given that federal legislation aimed at combating predatory subprime
mortgage lending has provide ineffective protection for borrowers, it is
now appropriate to turn to similar legislative attempts at the state level.
The first comprehensive state law targeting predatory lending was passed
by the North Carolina state legislature in 1999.119 Though it took a while
for any state or municipality to push back against predatory lending,
following North Carolina throwing the first salvo "there [was] an explosion
of legislation at the state and local level[s] passed in an attempt to fill the
many regulatory gaps."l 20 From 1999 to 2005, twenty-six states (including
the District of Columbia) enacted regulations against predatory lending
practices.1 21 Among the state responses were statutes ranging from only
modestly supplementing HOEPA, to ones with lower triggers for
qualification as a high cost loan and banning a variety of abusive practices,
which built directly upon the North Carolina model.
North Carolina has enacted two statutes to combat predatory lending: (1)
S. 1149 ("North Carolina Act") in 1999,122 which became the prime
impetus for other states to act similarly; and (2) the Mortgage Lending Act
in 2001, which took a very different approach and has only been emulated
by a few other states. 123 The North Carolina Act contained substantive
restrictions and prohibitions applicable to all home mortgages, including
prohibitions on "loan flipping,"124 financing of single premium
insurancel 25 and encouraging default in the refinance of debt.126 The act
119 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 332 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 24-1.1A - 24-10.2 (2010)); Azmy,
supra note 13, at 361 (explaining the explosion of legislation at the state and local levels targeting
predatory lending since 1999, when North Carolina passed the first comprehensive state law on the
issue).
120 Azmy, supra note 13, at 361.
121 Id; see also Combs, supra note 11, at 618 (noting that twenty-six states have some level of
regulation of predatory lending that is stricter than federal law).
122 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 24-L.IA - 24-10.2 (2010) (imposing restrictions and limitations on home
loan fees and providing consumer protections).
123 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-243.01 - 53-244 (2010); Burlingame, supra note 63, at 468 (stating that
some states have followed North Carolina's lead by passing mortgage lending regulation).
124 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10.2(c) (2010) "'Flipping' a consumer loan is the making of a consumer
home loan to a borrower which refinances an existing consumer home loan when the new loan does not
have reasonable, tangible net benefit to the borrower considering all of the circumstances, including the
terms of both the new and refinanced loans, the cost of the new loan, and the borrower's
circumstances." Burlingame, supra note 63, at 468.
125 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10.2(b) (2010) (making it unlawful for any lending in a consumer home
loan to finance any insurance premiums); Burlingame, supra note 63, at 468.
126 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10.2(d) (2010) (stating that no lender shall recommend or encourage
default on an existing loan in connection with the closing of a consumer home loan that refinances any
potion of such existing loan); Burlingame, supra note 63, at 468.
786
2011] PROTECTING THE CONSUMER 787
also put further restrictions on high-cost loans, for example, by requiring
home-ownership counseling for borrowers.127 The statutory language also
prescribes lower triggers for a loan to qualify as a high-cost loan than any
previous federal legislation had stipulated. 128 Of significance, the Attorney
General, the Commissioner of Banks or any private party to a high-cost
home loan can bring a cause of action against a lender. 129 North Carolina's
second predatory lending oriented legislation, the Mortgage Lending Act,
imposed "licensing, experience, and examination requirements on
individual employees involved in making or brokering mortgage loans
within the State," though it did not apply to regulated banking
institutions. 130 A license could be denied to someone with a past criminal
record, someone found to display moral turpitude, or someone who has
provided misleading application materials. 131
New York serves as an example of one of the more "aggressive" states
that followed North Carolina's lead.132 Chapter 626 of the laws of 2002
("New York Act") took effect April 1, 2003, and in addition to similar
prohibitions to those in HOEPA and the North Carolina Act, it provided
that a home loan would be deemed void under the law, if a court found that
the lender intentionally violated the law.133 Regarding remedies for when
127 Burlingame, supra note 63, at 468; C. Bailey King Jr., Consumer Protections Issues:
Preemption and the North Carolina Predatory Lending Law, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 377, 379-81 (2004)
(discussing the requirements necessary before a lender may make a "high-cost" loan, such as requiring
the borrower to receive home-ownership counseling).
128 Burlingame, supra note 63, at 468 ("A North Carolina loan will be considered a high-cost loan,
subject to the enhanced restrictions, if it meets any one of three triggers: (1) the APR is greater than ten
percentage points above the comparable U.S. Treasury security; (2) the points and fees exceed five
percent of the total loan amount; or (3) the prepayment penalty exceeds two percent of the amount
prepaid").
129 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.IE(d) (2010) (stating that the provisions of this section of the statute
can be enforced by the Attorney General, the Commissioner of Banks, or any party to a high-cost home
loan); Donna S. Harkness, Predatory Lending Prevention Project: Prescribing a Cure for the Home
Equity Loss Ailing the Elderly, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 31 (2000) (explaining that violations of
N.C.G.S. § 24-1.IE(d) are recognized as unfair and deceptive and can be enforced by the state attorney
general, the state bank commissioner or the borrower).
130 Burlingame, supra note 63, at 468.
131 Id. (specifying a past criminal record, displays of moral turpitude and presentation of
misleading materials during the application process as grounds for denying a license as a mortgage
broker); Donald C. Lampe, Wrong from the Start? North Carolina's "Predatory Lending" Law and the
Practice vs. Product Debate, 7 CHAP. L. REv. 135, 150 (2004) (providing "moral turpitude, past
criminal record, or misleading application materials" as the grounds for rejection of a mortgage
brokering license).
132 Azmy, supra note 13, at 363-364 (listing the District of Columbia, Illinois, New Mexico,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina and
South Carolina as the states that have followed North Carolina's lead in supplementing HOEPA with
stricter standards).
133 2002 N.Y. LAWS 626, (2010). If a court finds that a lender has intentionally violated the
applicable regulations, the loan agreement shall be void and the lender shall have no right to "collect,
receive or retain" any money associated with the loan. N.Y. BANK § 6-1(10) (2010) codifies the same
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lenders act unlawfully, the New York Act grants borrowers an affirmative
defense against foreclosure and allows for a private right of action against a
lender within six years of the origination of a loan.134 Subsequent
supplemental legislation strengthened the laws promulgated by the New
York Act by, inter alia, prohibiting additional practices with certain kinds
of loans (i.e. prepayment penalties) and requiring that plaintiffs in
foreclosure actions make specific affirmative allegations regarding their
standing at the commencement of an action. 135
While critics of state regulations based on the North Carolina model
focus on it being too restrictive on lenders, along with evidence of a
general decrease in subprime lending business in North Carolina, a 2003
study conducted by researchers at the University of North Carolina found
that the North Carolina regulations worked as intended, at least in the short
term. 136 "The [study] concluded that loan originations with predatory
features decreased substantially . .. but did not materially decrease either
the supply of subprime credit to low-income borrowers or the diversity of
subprime mortgage products traditionally extended to them."1 37 It is likely
that aggressive state predatory lending statutes will play a role in
preventing another crisis. It is difficult to determine, however, which
particular state guidelines strike the best balance of keeping the lending
business strong while sufficiently protecting the consumer because they
have not been around long enough to accurately measure long-term effects.
Also important to note is that federal preemption of state regulations has
undercut states' ability to exert their power to prevent another subprime
mortgage crisis. 138 Therefore, preemption principles and practices will be a
running theme through the remainder of this note.
language contained in § 10 of the session laws.
134 2002 N.Y. LAWS 626 (2010); N.Y. RP ACT & PRO § 1302(2) (2010); N.Y. BANK § 6-1(10)
(2010).
135 2007 N.Y. LAWS 552 (2010); 2008 N.Y. LAWS 472 (2008). New York passed further
regulatory legislation dealing with mortgage foreclosure in 2008 and 2009, the most recent of which is
the Governor's Program Bill No. 46 available at http://www.state.ny.us/govemor/bills/pdf/gpb 46.pdf.
Also, a memo summarizing the bill's provisions is available at http://www.state.ny.us/govemor/bills/
pdfgpbm 46.pdf.
136 Azmy, supra note 13, at 381.
137 Id.
138 See Justin Collins, Without Other Options: The Limited Effectiveness, Unique Availability, and
Overall Impact of State-Directed Lawsuits Against Predatory Lenders, 17 J.L. & POL'Y 231, 247-48
(2008) (arguing that despite the objections of various State Attorneys General, federal agencies have
issued a series of orders preempting state predatory lending statutes and leaving states with few options
to protect consumers); infra Part III (discussing two federal agencies who aggressively use federal
power to preempt state authority).
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III. FEDERAL AGENCIES CHARGED WITH PROTECTING THE CONSUMER
AND THE DAMAGING EFFECTS OF PREEMPTION
This part examines the various federal agencies that are charged with
enforcing federal regulations put in place to protect the consumer from
predatory business practices. It demonstrates that, in recent times, some of
these agencies have encroached on states' regulatory power to protect the
consumer, an interest which states traditionally have had primary authority
over. It also looks at particular actions by two federal agencies, the Office
of Thrift Supervision ("OTS") and the Office of the Comptroller of
Currency ("OCC"), which evidence their respective proclivity to be
aggressive in using federal preemption power to defeat state regulatory
authority.
Federal agencies charged with enforcing federal consumer protection,
including laws that resulted from the previously referenced Acts of
Congress aimed at addressing predatory lending, include the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC"), the Department of Housing and Urban Development
("HUD"), and federal banking regulators comprised of the OTS, the OCC,
the Federal Reserve Board ("FRB"), the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation ("FDIC") and the National Credit Union Administration
("NCUA").139 Despite their responsibilities, these regulatory agencies
undertook a very limited role in controlling predatory lending abuses prior
to the crisis. 140 The FTC was active in initiating actions against subprime
lenders by alleging unfair and deceptive practices in violation of the FTC
Act, which grants generally applicable federal authority in actions affecting
commerce. 141 However, the FTC brought only nineteen actions of this sort
from 1983-2003 and most of those cases had little impact on practices
because they were settled with lenders only paying restitution to borrowers
and simply saying that they will do better next time. 142 HUD had authority
to enforce RESPA, but for the most part failed to do so. 143 Finally the
139 Azmy, supra note 13, at 358 (explaining the varied roles of HUD, the FTC, the OCC, the OTS
and the NCUA in enforcement in the subprime market); Burlingame, supra note 63, at 469 (listing these
agencies as those involved in the federal administrative response to predatory lending).
140 Azmy, supra note 13, at 359; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONSUMER
PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY
LENDING 22 (2004) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d04280.pdf. According to HUD, in 2001, 178 lenders concentrated primarily on subprime loans. Of
these 178 lenders, only ten percent were federally regulated.
141 See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2010); Azmy, supra note 13, at
359(discussing FTC actions against subprime lenders).
142 GAO REPORT, supra note 140, at 37; Burlingame, supra note 63, at 470 (reporting the number
of FTC complaints against mortgage lenders).
143 GAO REPORT, supra note 140, at 36 ("HUD reported having taken a small number of actions to
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agencies that were most directly intertwined with mortgage lending were
two bureaus of the Treasury Department, the OCC, with primary authority
over national bank charters, and the OTS, with authority over savings
associations, savings banks, and savings and loans.144 Unfortunately, their
actions over the past decade have led scholars to suggest that "federal
regulators [are] better seen as a cause of predatory lending than a hedge
against it."145
Consumer protection was a traditional element of states' regulatory
power until the OTS and OCC, using their authority as agencies of the
federal government granted by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution,146 issued regulations to preempt the application of state
consumer protection laws directed at the prevention of predatory lending
by national banks and thrifts, along with their subsidiaries and agents,
resulting in less stringent regulation applying to those affected.147 While a
U.S. General Accounting Office ("GAO") report estimated that only ten
percent of lending institutions that primarily engage in subprime lending
are national banks or thrifts,148 when regulations from an agency act to
relax constraints on the institutions that fall under their authority, rivals in
the industry must respond to keep their market share.149 For example,
fringe and predatory lenders have sought to obtain their own federal
banking charters. Perhaps partially due to federal preemption, "consumer
lending is now dominated by federally chartered institutions, especially
national banks."50
OTS is explicitly authorized by The Home Owners' Loan Act
enforce RESPA . . . in cases involving predatory lending."); Azmy, supra note 13, at 358 (noting the
small number of actions taken to enforce RESPA).
144 12 U.S.C. § 1, 1462a(b) (2006) (stating the duties of the OCC and OTS, respectively); Adam J.
Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 143, 149
(2009) (discussing the powers of the OCC and OTS).
145 Peterson, supra note 59, at 525.
146 U.S. CONST. art. VI. cl. 2; Developed jurisprudence regarding the Supremacy Clause asserts
that federal regulations have the same preemptive effect as federal statutes, and that courts will only
review effects of preemption regulations under a reasonableness standard. See also Fid. Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
147 Levitin, supra note 144, at 145 (discussing the issues raised by the preemption of some state
consumer protection laws); see Peterson, supra note 59, at 516 (explaining the expanding preemption
power of federal statutes).
148 GAO REPORT, supra note 140, at 27.
149 Peterson, supra note 59, at 516; See Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory
Lending: Unmasking the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REv. 1, 72 (2005) (describing how federal
regulations that preempt state laws have created an incentive for those seeking to avoid state predatory
lending law to migrate into federal charters. The reason for this migration is that institutions that do not
fall under the authority of the federal regulations fear the institutions they represent will shift their
assets into better protected charters).
150 Levitin, supra note 144, at 150.
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(HOLA)151 to preempt state usury laws only as applied to national thrifts,
but the OTS has used its "plenary" authority over federal thrifts, as
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court,152 to employ preemption
aggressively. 153 For example, in 2004 the OTS asserted that independent
contractors performing mortgage brokering services hired by thrifts are not
subject to state licensing or registration laws.154 Pursuant to its authority,
OTS "issued letters concluding that predatory lending laws in Georgia,
New York, New Jersey, and New Mexico, which regulate any aspect of
credit terms, loan-related fees, disclosures, or the ability to finance a loan,
are preempted as they apply to savings institutions." 155 Also, while the
OCC's asserted preemption authority is less entrenched in the law than the
authority of the OTS,156 the OCC has adopted preemption rules by
piggybacking on an OTS action reasoning that the deregulatory move must
be allowed to place national banks on an equal plane with national
thrifts.157
In defining which state laws apply to real estate lending activities of
national banks, the OCC rules that "except where made applicable by
Federal law, state laws that obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank's
ability to fully exercise its Federally authorized real estate lending powers
151 12 U.S.C.§§ 1461-70 (2010).
152 See Fid. Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. De Le Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 162, 164-68 (1982)
(acknowledging that congress gave OTS broad authority to regulate thrifts); see also Eric Friedberg,
Portfolio Maintenance Use of the Due on Sale Clause in New York, 49 BROOK L. REV. 79, 83-85 (1982)
(discussing how the Supreme Court accepted the broad powers delegated to OTS by congress to
preempt state laws).
153 See 12 C.F.R. § 545.2 (2010) (claiming authority to preempt any state law "purporting to
address the subject of the operations of a Federal savings association"); see also Levitin, supra note
144, at 167 (explaining that OTS has been quite aggressive in claiming preemptive authority).
154 Memorandum from the Chief Counsel, Office of Thrift Supervision, re Authority of a Federal
Savings Association to Perform Banking Activities Through Agents Without Regard to State Licensing
Requirements (Oct. 25, 2004) (P-2004-7, 2004 OTS LEXIS 6 at 16) (opining that state laws regulating
independent agents performing marketing or solicitations on behalf of thrifts are inconsistent with
OTS's exclusive regulatory powers); see Peterson, supra note 59, at 528-29 (explaining that OTS
claimed exclusive authority to regulate independent agents of thrifts in order to give the thrifts the
freedom to decide whether to use its own employees or independent contractors without being subject
to state law).
155 Azmy, supra note 13, at 384.
156 Burlingame, supra note 63, at 471 (stating that OCC's preemption power is less entrenched in
the law than OTS); cf Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation
Doctrine and its Effect on Predatory lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518, 616-17 (2004) (arguing
that OCC is gearing up for challenges to its preemption power).
157 Levitin, supra note 144, at 169 (explaining that the OCC is able to piggyback on the OTS's
action); see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Point-Counterpoint: Federal Preemption: The OCC's Preemption
Rules Exceed the Agency's Authority and Present A Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and
Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 284 (2004) (arguing that the scope of the
OCC's preemption rules is "essentially the same as the breadth of preemption declared in the OTS's
regulations").
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do not apply to national banks," 58 along with agents and subsidiaries.159
The OCC has intervened on the side of national banks on numerous
occasions to prevent state regulation for consumer protection purposes.160
For example, a New York investigation into possible racial discrimination
in residential real-estate lending was interrupted by an OCC lawsuit to
enjoin the investigation. 161 Yet, in terms of living up to their responsibility
to protect consumers, the OCC has brought just eleven consumer protection
actions since 2000, two of which it initially tried to prevent as it did in New
York.162 By comparison, in 2003 alone, state bank agencies brought 4,035
consumer enforcement actions. 163 Despite these indications to the contrary,
the OCC claims to be firmly committed to combating predatory lending.164
Nonetheless, the actions of the OCC indicate that an interest in the safety
and soundness of national banks, which necessarily includes their level of
profitability,165 has trumped its interest in consumer protection, which
scholars have characterized as being "not first (or even second) on the
OCC's priority list."166
IV. GENERALLY APPLICABLE STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTES
SHOULD BE KEY TOOLS IN ENSURING THAT THERE WILL NEVER BE
ANOTHER CRISIS BY HOLDING LENDERS ACCOUNTABLE WHEN EVIDENCE
158 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a) (2010).
159 In a 2001 ruling, the OCC issued a regulatory preemption determination shielding used car
dealerships from state consumer protection laws where they are acting as an agent of a national bank.
Preemption Determination for Officers of the Comptroller of the Currency, 66 Fed. Reg. 28593, 28595
(May 23, 2001); Peterson, supra note 59, at 530. The OCC made clear that its preemption authority
extended to subsidiaries in a 2003 ruling regarding the Georgia Fair Lending Act. Burlingame, supra
note 63, at 473; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6A-1 (2010).
160 Levitin, supra note 144, at 152 (discussing OCC intervention on behalf of national banks to
prevent forced disclosure of nonpublic information); see Stephanie Mencimer, No Account: The
Nefarious Bureaucrat Who's Helping Banks Rip You Off, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2007,
http://www.tnr.com/print/article/no-account-0 (noting the lack of federal consumer enforcement
actions).
161 See Clearing House Ass'n v. Cuomo, 510 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 987
(2009). After successfully ending the New York investigation using its preemption powers, the OCC
failed to take up the investigation itself. Levitin, supra note 144, at 152.
162 Levitin, supra note 144, at 153. "[F]rom January 2000 to April 2009, the OCC has levied a
mere seventy-three fines, only six of which were for consumer-protection violations . . . two related to
discriminatory lending." Id;see Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Legal and Regulatory:
Enforcement Actions, http://apps.occ.gov/EnforcementActions/EnforcementActions.aspx (last visited
November 2, 2010).
163 Levitin, supra note 144, at 153; see also Mencimer, supra note 160, at 14 (noting the number of
state consumer enforcement actions in 2003).
164 Burlingame, supra note 63, at 471. See generally Julie L. Williams & Michael S. Bylsma,
Federal Preemption and Federal Banking Agency Response to Predatory Lending, 59 Bus. LAW 1193
(discussing OCC guidelines national banks can use to against making predatory loans).
165 Levitin, supra note 144, at 155.
166 Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 85 (2008).
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INDICATES THEY ENGAGED IN "UNFAIR PRACTICES"
This part of the note argues that flexible state UDAP statutes need to be
a piece of the puzzle going forward in order to protect borrowers from
predatory lenders. Section A summarizes and examines the potential
implications of a recent Massachusetts case in which the methodology used
could serve as a model for dealing with unscrupulous lending practices in
the future. Section B wraps up by explaining why widespread employment
of such a flexible standard is important, along with answering prospective
criticism of the model.
A. Recent Massachusetts Case: Commonwealth v. Fremont Investment &
Loan As A Model
a. Summary of Commonwealth v. Fremont Investment & Loan
On October 4, 2007 the Massachusetts Attorney General ("Attorney
General") commenced an action on behalf of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts ("State") against Fremont Investment and Loan
("Fremont"), and its parent Fremont General Corporation ("Fremont
General"), alleging that Fremont had engaged in unfair and deceptive
practices in violation of the Massachusetts state UDAP statute ("Mass.
UDAP statute"),167 in its subprime lending practices.168 About six months
prior to the Massachusetts lawsuit, Fremont, a California state-chartered
industrial bank, entered into an agreement with the FDIC to cease and
desist from various unsound banking practices, without admitting any
wrongdoing. 169 The Attorney General had previously tried to work with
Fremont by entering into a Term Sheet letter agreement ("Term Sheet")
that set forth a procedure for Fremont to follow when it wished to foreclose
on a residential mortgage loan, which entailed getting approval from the
Attorney General.170 The Attorney General ended up objecting to every
167 See MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 93A, § 2 (2006); supra pp. 3- 4.
168 Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, No. 07-4373-BLSI, 2008 WL 517279, at *1 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2008), affd, 897 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 2008).
169 Id. Though this step taken by the FDIC was positive, and it did later take further corrective
action against Fremont, note that none of the federal action taken was able to actually obtain redress for
any wronged consumers. Id. Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Issues Cease and Desist Order Against
Fremont Investment & Loan, Brea, California, and its Parents, (March 7, 2007) (on file with author).
170 Fremont, 2008 WL 517279, at *1 (showing the Attorney General had previously entered into a
Term Sheet Letter agreement with Fremont); Joy Harmon Sperling, Sperling on the Groundbreaking
Decision in Massachusetts v. Fremont Investment & Loan, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 2149 (2008)
(discussing that on July 10, 2007, following the entry of an Order to Cease and Desist entered by the
FDIC, Fremont and the Massachusetts Attorney General entered into a Term Sheet letter agreement).
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foreclosure proposed by Fremont, except to those in which the home was
not owner-occupied and the borrower could not be contacted.171 The
Attorney General then commenced this lawsuit.172 After the Term Sheet
was officially terminated by Fremont, the State moved for a preliminary
injunction that would bar Fremont, during the pendency of the action, from
foreclosing on a residential mortgage loan in Massachusetts without written
consent from the Attorney General.173
In employing reasoning later approved of by the Appeals Court of
Massachusetts and the Massachusetts Supreme Court, Justice Ralph Gants
granted the State's motion for a preliminary injunction finding that the
State was likely to succeed on the merits despite the terms of the
"structurally unfair" loans at issue not being affirmatively prohibited in any
applicable law.174 Further, the Court issued the injunction while
acknowledging that it was not unusual for subprime lenders to engage in
any of the practices in which Fremont engaged.175 The backbone of Justice
Gants' reasoning lies in the Court's finding that "it is unfair for a lender to
issue a home mortgage loan secured by the borrower's principal dwelling
that the lender reasonably expects will fall into default once the
introductory period ends unless the fair market value of the home has
increased at the close of the introductory period." 76 The Court adopted
reasonable expectation criteria similar to the standard enumerated in the
Massachusetts Predatory Home Loan Practices Act ("the Act"), a statute
that only applied to "high cost mortgage loans," a threshold that Fremont
was able to evade in constructing the numerous subprime loans at issue.177
Though the Court acknowledged that the loans at issue were not governed
by the Act, they based the applicability of the Mass. UDAP statute on their
finding that the loans fell within the penumbra of the concept of unfairness
171 Fremont, 2008 WL 517279, at *5-6 (outlining the Attorney General's objection to Fremont's
foreclosure plan).
172 Id at 6 (discussing the Attorney General's decision to file a complaint against Fremont).
173 Id. at 7 (documenting the State's filing of a preliminary injunction against Fremont).
174 Id. at 35 (issuing an injunction on the basis that the law did not address loans being unfair);
Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, No. 08-J-l 18, 2008 WL 2312648 (Mass. App. Ct. May 2,
2008) (upholding the order of the Superior Court); Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d
548, 551 (Mass. 2008) (declining to overturn the Superior Court and Appeals Court decision),
175 Fremont, 2008 WL 517279, at *26 (issuing the injunction against practices understood not to
be unusual).
176 Id (emphasis added). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts provided further support
for this line of reasoning by classifying Fremont's practices in giving mortgage loans whose viability
hinged on the strength of the housing market as "unreasonable, and unfair to the borrower . .. to
structure [the] loans on such unsupportable optimism." Fremont, 897 N.E.2d 548, at 558 (Mass. 2008).
177 Fremont, 897 N.E.2d at 554 ("[Iqt is unfair for a lender to issue a home mortgage loan secured
by the borrower's principal dwelling that the lender reasonably expects will fall into default").
794
PROTECTING THE CONSUMER
reflected in the Act:
The spirit of the Act is that a lender engages in predatory lending,
which is an unfair act in violation of [the Mass. UDAP statute], when
it makes a loan charging either high points, fees, or interest to a
borrower whom the lender reasonably believes will be unable to make
the scheduled payments and will therefore face the likelihood of
foreclosure. [This is true] even if the lender provides fair and
complete disclosure of the terms of the loan and the borrower is fully
informed of the risks he faces in accepting the loan. The unfairness,
therefore, does not rest in deception but in the equities between the
parties.178
Then, in breaking down this intuitive analysis into a workable test
regarding any particular loan, Justice Gants examined language in the Act,
as well as recommendations from the Attorney General and the FDIC, and
enumerated four characteristics that, if all present, would make a mortgage
loan presumptively unfair, effectively shifting the burden of production to
the lender to demonstrate that the loan was not actually unfair. 179 The
specific details of the "presumptively unfair" test as applicable to the Mass.
UDAP statute dealt with guidelines for ARMs, introductory rates, debt-to-
income ratios, loan-to-value ratios, and prepayment penalties;180 but
whether Justice Gants actually outlined the perfect test is not of great
importance. Instead, what needs to be focused on regarding this decision
was his willingness to use his judicial powers and the Mass. UDAP statute
to set such guidelines in the face of the blatantly unfair, but not statutorily
prohibited, practices of Fremont. His progressive reasoning is best
captured in his assertion that "the meaning of unfairness under [the Mass.
UDAP statute] is not fixed in stone ... it is forever evolving, not only to
178 Fremont, 2008 WL 517279 at *28. There have also been cases in which practices that would
amount to federal TILA violations were found to form the basis for state UDAP violations under state
laws in Connecticut and Illinois. See Cheshire Mortgage. Serv. v. Montes, 612 A.2d 1130 (Conn. 1992);
April v. Union Mortgage 709 F. Supp. 809 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
179 Fremont, 2008 WL 517279, at *27-28.
180 The test is enumerated as follows:
[Any mortgage loan secured by the borrower's principal dwelling should be presumed to be
structurally unfair if the loan possesses the four characteristics described above:
1. The loan is an ARM with an introductory period of three years or less;
2. The loan has an introductory or "teaser" rate for the initial period that is at least 3 percent
lower than the fully indexed rate;
3. The borrower has a debt-to-income ratio that would have exceeded 50 percent if the
lender's underwriters had measured the debt, not by the debt due under the teaser rate, but by
the debt due under the fully indexed rate; and
4. The loan-to-value ratio is 100 percent or the loan carries a substantial prepayment penalty
or a prepayment penalty that extends beyond the introductory period. Id.
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adapt to changing social, economic, and technological circumstances, but
also to reflect what we have learned to be unfair from our experience as a
commonwealth."181
Though the Mass. UDAP statute and how its use and classification in
precedent cases may not precisely mirror how similar statutory authority is
employed throughout the country, 182 given the prevalence of similar state
statutes across the nation, Justice Gants' thorough analysis of his authority
under the Mass UDAP statute should be examined in careful detail as it
provides a big key to preventing another crisis. Massachusetts precedent
dictates that three considerations are to be used in determining whether a
practice is unfair. First, and already referenced above, is whether the
practice is within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory or
other established concept of unfairness.183 Second, is whether the practice
is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous.184 Lastly, courts are
instructed to consider whether the practice causes substantial injury to
consumers, competitors or other businessmen.185 The broad power of the
Mass. UDAP statute is evidenced in decisions finding that statutorily
authorized acts are not automatically exempt from its authority;1 86 that
relief available is "neither wholly tortuous nor wholly contractual in nature,
and is not subject to the traditional limitations of preexisting causes of
action;" 87 and that it "mak[es] conduct unlawful which was not unlawful
under the common law or any prior statute."1 88 It is precisely this sort of
flexible authority that courts must employ to adequately protect consumers
from practices like predatory subprime lending in the future.
b. Implications of this Potentially Landmark Decision
The power of the Fremont decision has already been evidenced in
developments since the decision was rendered. After unsuccessful attempts
to get Justice Gants' decision reversed on appeal,189 in lieu of going to trial,
181 Id at 39.
182 See generally MARY DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW § 3:27 (Supp.
2009).
183 PMP Assocs. v. Globe Newspaper, 321 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Mass. 1975) (listing the elements of
an unfair business practice case); FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972) (repeating the
test for finding business practices unfair).
184 Sperry, 405 U.S. at 244; PMP, 321 N.E.2d at 917.
185 Sperry, 405 U.S. at 244; PMP, 321 N.E.2d at 917.
186 Fremont, 2008 WL 517279, at *8; Slaney v. Westwood Auto, 322 N.E.2d 768, 779 (Mass.
1975).
187 Fremont, 2008 WL 517279, at *8.
188 Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 316 N.E.2d 748, 755 n.8 (1974).
189 Commonwealth v. Fremont Invest. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548, 551 (Mass. 2008) (affirming the
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Fremont and Fremont General entered into a settlement with the State.
They agreed to make the terms of the preliminary injunction permanent,
thereby protecting 2,200 Fremont-originated loans from unrestricted
foreclosure, and paid $10 million in consumer relief, civil penalties and
costs.190 Further, in a subsequent Massachusetts case, Commonwealth of
Massachusetts v. H&R Block, Inc. et al., the trial court expanded on its
definition of presumptively structurally unfair loans to include loans that
were originated with reckless disregard of the risk of foreclosure.1 91 This
ruling was recently affirmed by the Massachusetts Appeals Court, which
cited the Massachusetts Supreme Court's approval of Fremont as a basis
for affirming the trial court's holding.192 Also, two more lawsuits grounded
in the holding from Fremont were filed against Bank of America Home
Mortgage and Wells Fargo Home Mortgage this past summer. 193 Local
media has framed the suits as "being watched locally and nationally
because, if successful, they would provide strength to advocates and
litigators struggling to make lenders accountable for 'toxic' mortgage loans
that have pushed millions of Americans into foreclosure."l 94
The way in which Justice Gants used the generally applicable Mass.
UDAP statute to hold Fremont responsible may not just be methodology
limited to protecting the consumer against predatory practices of state
chartered institutions, as there is evidence that generally applicable state
consumer protection statutes may not face the same preemption problems
as the more narrowly tailored state predatory lending statutes. 195 "The
District Court for the Northern District of California recently held that a
California law prohibiting all businesses from making misleading
motion judge's grant of preliminary injunction); Commonwealth v. Fremont Invest. & Loan, No. 08-J-
118, 2008 WL 2312648 (Mass. App. Ct. May 2, 2008) (declining to reverse the orders in question).
190 See Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Martha Coakley Reaches
$10 Million Settlement with Subprime Lender Fremont Investment and Loan (June 9, 2009), available
at www.mass.gov/?pagelD=cagopressrelease&L=1 &LO=Home&sid=Cago&b-pressrelease&f=2009_
06 09 fremont agreement&csid=Cago (stating the provisions Fremont agreed to in a settlement); see
also Muralikumar Anantharaman, Fremont General seeks bankruptcy protection, REUTERS U.K.,
available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKN1844381920080618 (documenting Fremont General's
filing for bankruptcy prior to settlement in this case).
191 Commonwealth v. H&R Block, Slip Op., Action No. 08-2474-BLS I (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 10,
2008) (describing "no documentation" loans).
192 Massachusetts Court Stops H&R Block, Option One Foreclosures, http://www.consumeraffairs
.com/news04/2009/11/ma blockoption one02.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2010) (summarizing the
Massachusetts Appeals Court ruling).
193 McKensi v. Bank of Am., No. 09-1 1940-JGD, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99540 at *3 (D. Mass.
Sept. 22, 2010) (citing "presumptively unfair" and "doomed for foreclosure" from Fremont); McKim,
supra note 2 1. http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2009/08/05/attomeysueslenderssays they
created toxicproducts/ (noting that recent cases have relied on Fremont).
194 McKim, supra note 21.
195 See supra note 134 (describing narrowly tailored state predatory lending statutes).
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representations was not preempted as applied to a national bank because it
was a law of general applicability."l 96 Also, an example of federal
authority encouraging the use of generally applicable state consumer
protection law lies in Fremont in that the Term Sheet that Fremont signed
with the FDIC "expressly declares that its provisions do not bar a state
Attorney General from seeking further remedies against Fremont for unfair
or deceptive practices." 97 Further, if generally applicable state consumer
protection statutes can get past preemption hurdles, such statutes would be
more effective than the FTC Act, which prohibits unfair trade practices in
or affecting trade or commerce on the federal level,198 because the FTC Act
only grants enforcement to the FTC, whereas similar state remedies usually
allow for private damage actions as well as state enforcement.199
B. Generally Applicable State Consumer Protection Laws Should Be Key
Tools in Keeping Lenders Honest and Answering Prospective
Criticism
After a full examination of the causes and effects of the subprime
mortgage crisis, there is plenty of blame to go around, and many opinions
as to who should shoulder that blame, but no one can deny that the system
under which the lending industry operated failed miserably. It is also
evident that some federal agencies were as concerned about protecting
lenders at least as much as they were concerened about protecting
consumers. Furthermore, any specific regulations that were put in place
did not prevent lenders from continually being able to structure their loans
around such regulations to maximize profit. Also, as a leading scholar has
noted:
[d]efinitions [of predatory lending] are particularly elusive because
the classification of lending behavior as predatory or fair depends
invariably upon context. Any definition, therefore, must be flexible
and accommodate context and not only should identify core
objective criteria but also should focus on the intent of the lender as
196 Levitin, supra note 144, at 170.
197 Commonwealth v. Fremont Invest. & Loan, No. 07-4373-BLSI, 2008 WL 517279, at *50
(Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2008), affd, 897 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 2008) (granting the motion of
preliminary injunction).
198 See Azmy, supra note 13, at 359 (discussing weaknesses in the FTC Act).
199 Id ("regulatory agencies [such as the FTC] have had a very limited role in controlling the
abuses in the subprime market"); Paul M. Schwartz, Where Do We Go From Here? The Battle Against
Predatory Subprime Lending, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 213, 234 (noting the lack of a private
action under the unfair and deceptive acts and practices legislation).
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well as the impact on the victim. 200
In considering both the necessity of a flexible standard and the stark
evidence of previous failures, it is incumbent on federal and state judiciary
branches to follow Massachusetts jurisprudence and Judge Botsford's lead,
both of which recognize that just because a particular lending practice is
prevalent or not statutorily prohibited it does not follow that the lender at
issue did not take unfair advantage of the borrower.
There are numerous voices that would likely advocate against taking the
proactive approach towards guarding against unfairness to
consumers/borrowers that this note advocates. However, all such
arguments crumble in light of the staggering breadth of the subprime
mortgage crisis and public interest at stake going forward. Some think that
this entire mess should be put on the shoulders of irresponsible consumers,
and that further consumer protection laws will only encourage other
consumers to act recklessly. 201 Others divert focus away from lender tactics
that led to the crisis by framing recent lawsuits brought by states and cities
as merely a search for unconventional ways to come up with funds for
basic services. 202 This viewpoint further claims that an unpopular industry
is getting victimized despite their activities being lawful and even
encouraged at the time.203 There are likely some who think that the threat
of all lenders being subject to generally applicable state consumer
protection laws, along with the more pointed regulations they are currently
under, is too burdensome - as evidenced by the preemption rationalizations
made by the OCC to protect federal banks. 204 Along the same lines, other
200 Azmy, supra note 13, at 300-01.
201 See McKim, supra note 21, at 3 ("'You are supposed to act responsibly as an adult when you
are signing those contracts,' said [the Vice President] of a New Jersey company that publishes
consumer loan information"); Danielle Ulman, Report: Md's Foreclosure Process Needs a Complete
Overhaul, THE DAILY RECORD, Jan. 8, 2008 (interviewing a local civic leader who stated, "I do fault
the consumers some . . . I just know some consumers made some decisions that they knew in their
hearts were wrong.")
202 Louise Story, Cuomo Sues Bank ofAmerica, Even as It Settles With S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5,
2010 (pointing out that the transaction that formed the basis for the Attorney General's suit against
Bank of America "had nothing to do with causing the crisis"); Diana Golobay, New York Sues BofA
Merrill Lynch over Subprime Investments, HousingWire, July 23, 2010, available at
http.//www.housingwire.com/2010/07/23/new-york-sues-bofa-merrill-lynch-over-subprime-investments
(reporting that comptroller sues on behalf of New York state common retirement fund).
203 JPMorgan Chief Braces for Battle -Dimon Ready to Take On Washington, THE AUSTRIALIAN,
Apr. 8, 2010, at 23 (quoting CEO Jaime Dimon: "The incessant broad-based vilification of the banking
industry isn't fair and it is damaging"); Story, supra note 202 (citing others who believe Kenneth Lewis
was unfairly vilified during the financial meltdown).
204 See 69 C.F.R. § 1904, 1908 (2004) ("As we have leamed from ... the inquiries received by the
OCC's Law Department ... national banks' ability to conduct operation to the full extent authorized by
Federal law has been curtailed as a result [of efforts by states to apply state laws to bank activities].");
Burlingame, supra note 63, at 473-74 ("the plethora of state and local laws (specifically the anti-
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critics think that "too many forms of lending regulation could drive up the
cost of credit and harm the very low income borrowers the regulation is
intended to help." 205 Finally, even some of those who are in favor of more
regulations would likely oppose this note's model because they place much
of the fault for this crisis in a deregulatory agenda of the last
administration, and think that the federal agencies that failed will now do
better in light of the crisis and shifting agendas. 206
Putting aside the varying levels of accuracy behind each prospective
argument in opposition and assuming that the respective points are
grounded in truth, countervailing factors still suggest that generally
applicable state consumer protection laws should be key in the eradication
and rebuilding of a failed system. Those that wish to focus either on
irresponsibility of consumers or "money grabs" by elected representatives
in an effort to gain favor with their constituents must still concede that it is
the lenders themselves who are best versed in the viability of their
products. Therefore, in order to prevent another crisis, these lenders must
be held to a standard beyond simply trying to maximize profit within the
fixed rules, and instead should need to have a reasonable basis for believing
the loan product that they are providing the borrower is more than just an
unfair trap. Further, even if lenders are indeed being victimized now
because of their current unpopularity, in light of the present crisis
conditions it would best be left to the judicial system to weed out the
frivolous claims from the legitimate ones, as it has been doing.207 To those
who may decry the case-by-case flexibility that this note calls for as being
too burdensome on lenders and resulting in less availability of consumer
loans, the only burden resulting from the application of state UDAP
statutes would be to take unfair loans off the market that should not have
been issued in the first place. If some low-income borrowers cannot obtain
loans, it is just an unfortunate but necessary consequence in light of the
crisis. Lastly, it must be noted that even if a deregulatory agenda from
federally elected officials is partially to blame for the crisis, in
predatory lending laws) attempting to limit bank lending activities were impeding national banks'
abilities to operate effectively, thus making this an essential regulation").
205 Eggert, supra note 61, at 605.
206 Peterson, supra note 59, at 526 ("[P]erhaps [past] efforts . . . have more to do with a
deregulatory agenda than an effort to hang the balance of power in the dual banking system").
207 Courts have generally not been receptive to class actions seeking to rescind loans, nor actions
against lenders on public nuisance grounds. See, e.g., Platt et al., New and Evolving Mortgage
Litigation Issues, in 14'" ANNUAL CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION INSTITUTE, at 70-71
(PLI Corp. Law & Prac, Course Handbook Series No. 18521, 2009); Brian P. Brooks, Public Nuisance
Litigation against Subprime Industry Hits Roadblock in Cleveland, 10 J. FEDERALIST Soc'Y PRAC.
GROUPS 109 (2009) available at: http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20090720_BrooksEngage l02.pdf.
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consideration of unpredictable shifting of political tides, it would be foolish
to entirely depend on the same failed system in the future.
CONCLUSION
The devastation caused by the subprime mortgage crisis dictates that all
possible precautions must be taken to prevent another event of this nature
from occurring again. Further enactment of legislation aimed at regulating
lenders on the state and federal levels, along with relaxation of preemption
rules hampering such pointed state consumer protection laws, should
certainly be engaged in going forward. However, to ensure lasting
protection for the consumer against another crisis, it is imperative that the
law allows for the flexibility afforded by state UDAP statutes to be in play,
whenever possible, as part of a framework for preventing consumers from
being unfairly taken advantage of by predatory mortgage lenders.

